Introduction
In The aim of this paper is to quantify the potential outcomes for different countries of a Doha Round agreement on agricultural trade liberalisation. The Doha Round has been termed the 'Doha Development Agenda', as one of the principal ambitions set out in the Doha Declaration is that this Round should consider the needs of developing countries and that its outcome should be beneficial to them. Reflecting this, the paper examines the consequences for developing countries of the Round. As developing countries are not a homogenous group and therefore their responses to further trade liberalisation are expected to vary, special attention is given to considering the relative outcomes for two of the poorest groups of developing countries, defined as the EBA group (Least Developed Countries benefiting from the EU's Everything But Arms initiative) and the Rest of ACP group (other African, Caribbean and. Pacific countries which benefit from preferential access to the EU market under the Cotonou Agreement but on less generous terms than the EBA group).
The Doha negotiations are comprehensive both in terms of their country coverage (nearly all countries are now WTO members) and sectoral coverage (they cover liberalisation of agricultural, manufacturing and services trade as well as clarification of WTO rules). The focus of this paper is on the global liberalisation of trade in agricultural commodities. To quantify the effects of such an agreement requires the use of a model of the global economy.
The model used in this study, the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model and database, is well suited for modelling the impact of changes in the world trading system. It is a comparative static, multi-regional, computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the world economy, with over eighty regions and fifty sectors separately distinguished. All markets in the model are perfectly competitive and exhibit constant returns to scale.
The base year of the latest version of the GTAP database, Version 6.0, is 2001. Even if WTO negotiations reach a successful conclusion in the near future, the time-span for implementation and the impact of reforms will stretch over a number of years. With this in mind, the base data are projected forward to 2014 to allow more realistic modelling of the effects of any agreement. This baseline updates the GTAP database using macro-economic forecasts and by incorporating events including China's accession to the WTO, enlargement of the EU, the Agenda 2000 and Mid-Term Review reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy, the Everything But Arms (EBA) agreement and the elimination of MFA textile quotas. The simulation of trade liberalisation scenarios is then implemented by introducing shocks to this baseline.
Even prior to the launch of the Doha Development Agenda in 2001, research on the potential effects of further trade liberalisation from a new Round had begun.
As a primary aim of the Doha Round is the promotion of the development needs of less developed countries, a considerable body of literature on the subject has already been undertaken. Charlton and Stiglitz (2005) provide a survey of a range of CGE-based estimates of the welfare gains to the world economy. The magnitude of the results varies between studies, with the majority indicating that industrialised countries expect to achieve the largest share of the gains from liberalisation. This effect is particular strong in the areas of agricultural and service liberalisation but holds for other sectors also.
The effects for developing countries are generally found to be smaller, however most studies conclude that they will benefit in welfare terms from further liberalisation. When the welfare gains are measured as a percentage of GDP rather than in absolute terms, in many cases the relative gains to developing countries will be greater than those achieved by the industrialised nations. Anderson and Martin (2005) calculate the gains from the complete removal of protection on agricultural and manufacturing goods to be worth 1.2 per cent and 0.6 per cent of GDP for developing and industrialised countries respectively.
As noted above, developing countries not are heterogeneous. For example, they vary in terms of their level of economic development, their comparative advantage in different commodities and in their trading relationship with other countries and regions. Bouet et al. (2004) highlight the importance of accurately accounting for three factors: the choice of disaggregation of the developing countries, the degree of overhang (in tariffs and domestic support) and the existence of preferential agreements. Their estimates of the global welfare gains, and the gains to developing countries, are considerably lower than much of the previous literature.
The trade liberalisation scenario implemented in this paper incorporates the three pillars of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture: market access, domestic support and export competition. This paper examines specifically the effects of further agricultural trade liberalisation on the global economy as well as looking in detail at two issues that will affect the outcomes for the poorest developing countries.
First, the trade liberalisation scenario simulated in this paper is broken down between the impact of liberalisation by industrialised and developing countries. The GTAP model allows for the shocks applied to the various regions to be altered, allowing us to simulate special and differential treatment of developing countries and give specific attention to analysing the impacts upon them.
Second, by comparing the outcomes for two similar groups of developing countries that enjoy different preferential trading arrangements with the European Union, we can demonstrate the effects of the erosion of this advantage as further liberalisation forces the EU to reduce the margin of preference accorded to these regions. These two groups are also distinguished in that they will be asked to undertake different levels of commitments with respect to their own liberalisation under a Doha Round Agreement. The importance of these differences are underlined by the following analysis.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the process of projecting the world economy forward to 2014 and the structural changes that result. Section 3 outlines the trade liberalisation scenario simulated in this paper and presents the results of this simulation. Section 4 presents the conclusions.
Methodology

The Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) Model and Database
The empirical work undertaken in this paper employs the computable general equilibrium (CGE) model and database known as GTAP. This type of model is a powerful tool enabling quantitative analysis of trade issues. GTAP in particular, with its wide country coverage and extensive database, is designed for precisely this task.
GTAP is a one period model, multi-regional, CGE model. All markets in the model are perfectly competitive and exhibit constant returns to scale. This paper employs the standard model, however it can be extensively modified to suit more particular modelling requirements. The primary reference for information on the model is Hertel (1997) and the GTAP website.
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The world economy consists of eighty-seven economies (referred to in the model as "regions") and fifty-seven sectors/commodities interlinked via demand and production linkages within regions, and bilateral trade flows between them. The structure of these regions is the same. Each provides an elaborate representation of the economy including the interactions between the agents in the model (private households, government and firms) and linkages between all of world production and trade. The number of sectors is the same in each region and all commodities are produced in every region. The Armington (1969) assumption is used to differentiate between homogenous commodities from different regions.
The construction and calibration of the database is documented in Dimaranan and McDougall (2005) . The database is composed of three elements: national inputoutput tables for each region represented in the model, international trade data linking the regions and protection data. The base year of the current version is 2001 and all data is represented in 2001 US dollars.
Model Closure
A standard general equilibrium closure is used in all simulations in this study. This implies all prices (except the numeraire)
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, regional incomes and quantities of producible commodities are determined endogenously. Tax (or subsidy) rates, technology and factor endowments are exogenously fixed. A medium-term closure is assumed. Labour and capital are assumed to be perfectly mobile between sectors. Land and natural resources are imperfectly mobile (or sluggish) between sectors. No factor endowments are mobile between regions and all are assumed to fully employed within regions (there is no unemployment of labour or capital). In terms of macroeconomic closure, investment is savings-driven and the current balance is assumed to be exogenous.
Policy interventions (tax and subsidies) are modelled as price wedges. GTAP does not track individual taxes and subsidies. The value of an intervention is calculated by comparing values of transactions at agent and market prices or market and world prices. Any difference between them is due to a policy intervention. Whether this intervention has a positive or negative impact on prices depends on the net effect of the taxes and subsidies. If taxes on a particular commodity are greater than the subsidies, then the market price will be above the agent price for that commodity.
Aggregation
In this paper, twenty regions are distinguished. Eleven are industrialised countries or regions: six regions representing EU countries, Rest of EFTA, the USA, Canada, the Former Soviet Union and High-Income Asian countries. The remaining nine regions are developing countries or groups of countries. India and China are individually distinguished, also represented are the Mercosur group of countries, the Mediterranean rim countries and remaining Asian and Latin American countries. 4 The Everything But Arms (EBA) group of least developed countries is represented, although the GTAP aggregation does not permit the inclusion of all fifty EBA countries in this region, as many are not individually represented in the database. 5 The Rest of ACP region encompasses the remaining African-Pacific-Caribbean (ACP) countries that do not qualify for the EBA. 6 On the sectoral level, nine agri-food sectors have been distinguished, consisting both of primary agriculture and processed products. There are also nine manufacturing industries and five service sectors. Table 1 shows the full regional and sectoral aggregation chosen in this paper.
Construction of the Baseline 2001 -2014
The base year of the current version 6.0 of the GTAP database is 2001. Even if WTO negotiations reach a successful conclusion in the near future, the time-span for implementation and impact of reforms will stretch over a number of years. With this in mind, the base data are projected forward until 2014 to allow more realistic modelling of the effects of any agreement. In addition, the standard GTAP model is extended to incorporate the agricultural budget of the European Union in order to capture the impact of further agricultural trade liberalisation on the net flow of funds between EU member states arising from EU agricultural policy.
The construction of this baseline is achieved by running a pre-simulation experiment, the outcome of which is used as a baseline against which to compare the results of the trade liberalisations scenarios implemented in the study. The construction of the baseline is divided into two components. First, policy changes, both events that have already occurred since 2001 and those that are expected to occur in the future, are implemented to create a more realistic policy landscape. Second, macroeconomic projections are used to simulate the expected changes to the world economy between the dates in question. Simply put, the EU has agreed to the unilateral elimination of tariffs and quotas on imports from these countries, on all commodities except those related to the arms trade. Effective from 2001 for most quotas as foreseen under the Agreement on Textiles and Clothes. 8 We also assume that Russia joins the WTO during the baseline period. The terms of accession are not specifically modelled, but Russia is assumed to participate in the liberalisation scenarios based on its tariff structure in 2001.
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The second phase in constructing the baseline to 2014 is to shock factor endowments in the model following the approach of Walmsley et al. (2000) . These shocks are based on forecasts of factor growth rates over the baseline period. GDP, skilled and unskilled labour, population and capital stock in each region are shocked. The main source is Brockmeier and Salamon (2003) with additional data from Jensen and Frandsen (2003) . 
The EU Agricultural Budget Module
In the standard GTAP model there is no direct link between tax revenue and government expenditure and there is no explicit representation of the EU budget.
11 Agricultural subsidies (direct payments, input and output subsidies, market price support and export subsidies) are assumed entirely financed through the regional household of each country or region, and there are no intra-European revenue or expenditure flows. This underestimates the negative impact of reforms which lower market prices and thus the inflow of CAP funds for a net exporting country in the EU.
To accurately model shocks such as enlargement or, at a later stage, to simulate the effects of trade liberalisation within a regional union such as the EU, the standard GTAP model is extended to incorporate an EU agricultural budget module based on the approach of Brockmeier (2003) . This is accomplished via the addition of a new social accounting matrix (SAM). This SAM moves the EAGGF products, the EBA agreement was fully phased in by beginning 2004. Full market access will be delayed for some sensitive products: sugar (July 2009), rice (September 2009) and bananas (January 2006) , however all import tariffs on goods from the EBA region to the EU are assumed to be fully eliminated by the end of the baseline period. 8 There is disagreement about how appropriate it is to include the CAP MTR and indeed the EU's EBA scheme as part of the baseline in measuring the impact of the Doha Round Agreement. The starting point for a new Agreement is the Uruguay Round baseline of bound tariffs, export subsidy disciplines and ceilings on trade-distorting domestic support. Arguably, the EU undertook the MTR in part to allow it to make a meaningful offer in the Doha Round negotiations. Similarly, part of the motivation for the introduction of the EBA scheme was to bolster its credentials in supporting a prodevelopment outcome in these negotiations (Matthews and Gallezot, 2006) . We agree in principle that this is the correct way to measure the full impact of a successful Doha Round Agreement. However, because we are interested in exploring the differential effect of trade liberalisation on developing countries with different levels of pre-existing access to third country markets, for the purposes of this paper we incorporate these EU reforms into the baseline. 9 The way these policy changes are modelled is explained in greater detail in Matthews and Walsh (2005) . 10 See Matthews and Walsh (2005) for the details of these factor endowment shocks. 11 All taxes (or subsidies) are collected (or disbursed) by a regional household and there are no flows between regions. revenues and expenditures from the regional household to the EU budget. The EU collects 75% of import tariff revenues from agents in the model and a GDP 12 tax is levied on the regional households of the member regions. This tax is determined endogenously to ensure the overall EU agricultural budget is balanced and it thus approximates both the VAT and GDP elements of revenue that accrue to the EU. The difference between revenues and expenditures of each member state is the net transfer to that region arising from the operation of the CAP. The sum of the net transfers of each region is zero to ensure that the overall agricultural budget balances.
Changes to Developing Countries over the Baseline 2001-2014
This section describes the changes in the structures of developing country economies over the period of the baseline 2001-2014. In particular, we focus on the changes for the Everything But Arms (EBA) group of the world's poorest countries and the Rest of the African-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) region countries (Tables 2 and 3 respectively). It is the structure of the world economy in 2014 that will determine the impact of WTO liberalisation, rather than economic and protection structures in 2001.
In the baseline period the average GDP growth rate is 62 per cent, with most developing countries regions growing at a rate close to the average. The EBA region grows slightly faster than average in GDP terms, however in capital accumulation and skilled labour terms, the region is projected to perform less well.
The dependence of EBA countries on exports of primary products (primarily minerals and oil) as well as textiles is highlighted by the self-sufficiency indicators in Table 2 . Domestic output in the EBA region increases across all sectors with particularly strong growth projected in sugar (among primary commodities), the transport and electronic sectors (in industry) and public services. This is driven by higher domestic consumption and by increased exports in these sectors. The changes reflect a shift from consumption of agricultural products to industrial goods as the region grows and becomes richer over the period of the baseline. Exports to EU and non-EU markets both increase, by approximately 30 per cent and 50 per cent respectively, encouraged in part by implementation of the EU's EBA scheme.
Unlike the EBA region, the export surplus of the Rest of the ACP region is driven by high ratios of output to domestic consumption in the crops, sugar and transport services sectors (Table 3) . Changes for the Rest of ACP region are broadly similar, if less pronounced, than for the EBA region. Output in the textiles and clothing sector increases by less than the average in both regions, and 12 In reality, the EU taxes gross national income (GNI), however in GTAP any such taxes are levied on the regional household.
indeed exports from the Rest of ACP region in this sector are projected to fall, reflecting the more intense competition from Asia, and in particular China, following the removal of MFA quotas.
Trade Liberalisation: Simulation and Results
This section describes the agricultural trade liberalisation scenario implemented in this paper and presents the results. The scenario incorporates reductions in agricultural import tariffs, domestic support and export subsidies. This simulation is stylised because there is as yet no agreement on the modalities of a final agreement. Our simulation is based on the Framework Agreement reached in July 2004. 13 As the Framework Agreement contains few specific figures or targets, certain assumptions have been made.
Special and differential treatment (SDT) of developing countries (DCs) is incorporated in the scenario where appropriate. As noted in Section 2.3, the aggregation chosen in this paper features eleven industrialised country (IC) regions and nine developing country regions. The EBA group of developing countries are assumed to the world poorest or least developed countries (LDC). Unless otherwise noted, SDT is assumed to imply that DCs implement two-thirds of the level of commitments (e.g., a tariff cut) undertaken by ICs and that LDCs are exempted any reduction commitments.
The trade liberalisation shocks are implemented using the updated database created from the baseline experiments described in the previous section. The shocks required to implement the trade liberalisation scenario are thus implemented against this baseline featuring the global economy as projected in 2014.
To aid in the analysis of the outcomes, the results of each simulation are decomposed into the effects due to liberalisation of ICs and effects due to liberalisation in DCs. A feature of GEMPACK (the software package used to implement the GTAP model) allows for the results of any particular shock in a simulation to be decomposed into parts known as "subtotals". Subtotals may be decomposed by region (in the example above) or by commodity. The sum of subtotals need not necessarily equal the total result, as will be the case if all component parts of a shock are not specified. 14 13 Details of July 2004 agreement available at www.wto.org. 14 For more information on GEMPACK, see Harrison and Pearson (1994) and www.gempack.com.. See Harrison et al. (1999) for more detailed discussion of the decomposition of results and the subtotal feature.
Simulation Design
Market Access
Applied agricultural import tariffs are cut by 50 per cent in this simulation. The cut is a linear across all agricultural sectors. To reflect the special and differential treatment of DCs, the import tariffs of these regions are subjected to a 34 per cent reduction, and LDCs are exempted from any reduction commitment.
The tariff rates in the GTAP model and database are effective (or applied) rates. WTO negotiations are based on bound tariff levels. In many cases, there will be a degree of tariff overhang whereby the bound ceiling exceeds the applied rate by a considerable amount. A 50 per cent in the bound rate may not translate into an equal reduction in applied rates. This is particularly the case in DCs but can also occur in ICs. Implementing reductions in applied rates by 50 per cent, as done in this study, may overestimate the gains from trade liberalisation unless the average cut in bound rates agreed in the Doha Round negotiations is substantially greater. In other words, cutting applied tariffs by 50 per cent implies agreement on a substantially larger cut in bound tariffs once the tariff overhang impact is factored in.
Export Competition
The July 2004 Framework contains a commitment to fully phase out the use of export subsidies for agricultural products and therefore their complete elimination has been implemented in the simulation.
Domestic Support
On domestic support, the only firm commitment contained in the Framework is the agreement that overall trade distorting support will not exceed 80 per cent of its current level by the end of the first year. This includes final bound AMS (aggregate measure of support), the permitted de minimis levels and permitted blue box levels, with future reductions to be based on a tiered formula implying greater reductions for those countries that maintain the highest levels of support.
Domestic support as currently represented in the GTAP model does not allow for a full analysis of overall distorting support as defined in the July Framework. In this simulation, reductions in domestic support are simulated as cuts to direct payments linked to production, intermediate input subsidies and output subsidies. Payments decoupled from production in the EU and USA are assumed to qualify for the Green Box and therefore are exempt from reductions. The market price support components of AMS are not modelled. The scenario implemented is a modest reduction of 20 per cent for non-exempt support in the EU and USA and 5 per cent for all other regions reflecting the tiered formula approach whereby those with higher levels of trade distorting support are expected to implement the most substantial cuts. 15 As in the case of market access, results are decomposed by the source of the reductions.
Box 1: Summary of Simulation
Market Access: Applied agricultural import tariffs are reduced by 50, 34 and 0 per cent for industrialised, developing and least developed countries respectively.
Domestic Support:
Trade-distorting domestic support is reduced by 20 per cent in the EU and USA and by 5 per cent elsewhere.
Export Competition:
A global elimination of agricultural export subsidies.
Results
The results of the experiment outlined above are presented in this section. The overall effects for the world economy and the share of the gains to developing countries are first discussed. This is followed by more detailed analysis of the impacts on developing countries of further liberalisation as simulated in this study and an explanation of the factors driving these results. All results presented are net of the effect of the macro-economic projections and policy changes built into the baseline, allowing the isolation of the effects due to the various trade liberalisation scenarios and the results are decomposed by liberalisation by industrialised country (IC) and developing country (DC) regions.
Global Effects
The global change in welfare as measured by the equivalent variation in millions of US dollars and as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product in 2014, are presented in Table 4 . 16 The net result is a gain for the world economy as whole of 0.05 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP). The modest nature of the estimated gains reflects, in part, the nature of the model being used (a static, oneperiod model assuming fixed resources and perfect competition, so the only source of gains from trade liberalisation arise from the reallocation of resources between sectors and any consequential terms of trade effects on individual countries). They also reflect the limited nature of the trade liberalisation scenario which is undertaken (a partial reduction in tariffs and other trade-distorting measures, but only in the agricultural sector). The liberalisation of all three pillars generates positive welfare impacts overall, with the largest contribution from tariff reductions, followed by domestic support and export subsidies.
Across the different regions identified in the model, the results are more mixed. The major winners are the countries that impose the most significant distortions on agricultural trade and it is typical in such simulations to observe welfare gains due to improved allocative efficiency when these distortions are reduced. Net exporters of agricultural commodities, such as the Mercosur region, also perform strongly. The EU gains from the export subsidy elimination at the expense of netfood importing regions. The effect of the reduction in agricultural tariffs is considerably greater in magnitude than the cuts in domestic support and the elimination of agricultural export subsidies.
Overview of Results for Developing Countries
Eight of the twenty regions disaggregated in this study are considered to be DCs. This section presents the results for DCs overall, whilst the following section focuses on two of these groups of countries in more detail.
As Table 4 shows, in GDP terms, the Rest of ACP, Mercosur and the Rest of World are the biggest winners in welfare terms. Their gains are considerably above the world average. Four DC regions, the EBA group, China, Rest of Latin America and the Mediterranean, suffer a welfare loss from liberalisation. Table 4 also confirms the importance of tariff reductions, compared to domestic support cuts and export subsidy elimination, to the total welfare gain for developing countries. The relatively small contribution from domestic support arises from the modest nature of the cuts assumed and the exemption of non-trade distorting support from reductions.
In Table 5 , the distribution of the global welfare gains compares the contribution by regions implementing reform to those that capture the benefits. At the global level, approximately 85 per cent of the welfare gains are due to liberalisation of ICs compared to 15 per cent from DC liberalisation. The main source of gains for ICs is liberalisation by ICs themselves, but the gains for DCs derive almost equally from liberalisation by ICs and liberalisation from within their own group of countries. Whilst DCs gains from increased access to IC markets as a result of lower import tariffs imposed on their exports, they also increase their welfare as a result of allocative efficiency gains from reducing their own tariff protection.
Changes in wages are shown in Table 9 , calculated as the change in the ratio of the returns to skilled and unskilled labour to the CPI in each region, respectively. These results reinforce the welfare change results. Regions that enjoy improved welfare from liberalisation will also see returns to labour also increase, with a likely positive impact on poverty.
Factors Underlying the Impacts of Liberalisation on Developing Regions
In this section, the results of the EBA region and the Rest of the ACP region are examined in detail. This comparison is revealing for two reasons. First, between them these regions represent most of the poorest countries in the study. The way in which they are affected by agricultural trade liberalisation is one measure of whether the Doha Round can live up to its promise to be a Development Round. Second, despite their similarities, they experience very different outcomes from further trade liberalisation as simulated in this paper. Comparison of the two illustrates the challenges and opportunities for DCs in the Doha Development Agenda.
As indicated in Table 4 , the EBA group of countries experiences a decrease in its welfare resulting from trade liberalisation. By contrast, the Rest of ACP region is one of the biggest winners in GDP terms. By comparing the impact of liberalisation on these two regions, we identify and examine the two principal reasons for these differences: (i) the importance of allocative efficiency gains and the impact of special and differential treatment for DCs; and (ii) the impact of the erosion of preferential access to IC markets.
Allocative Efficiency Effects
As already noted, for most regions in this study, the major benefits are driven by their own trade liberalisation and the improvements in allocative efficiency that arise from the elimination of their own barriers to trade. The reduction in distortionary tariffs or subsidies allows resources within a country, which were previously tied up in subsidised sectors, to be reallocated to other sectors of the economy in which they will earn a higher return. Using these resources more efficiently increases the welfare of the region. This is illustrated by the plight of the EBA region. Special and differential treatment (SDT) of developing countries implies that this region, composed of the least developed economies in the world, is exempt from commitments to liberalise. Their lack of liberalisation means they do not enjoy the gains in allocative efficiency that other regions achieve. This contrasts sharply with the outcome for the Rest of ACP group. This is confirmed by Table 6 , which shows the decomposition of the welfare change into allocative efficiency, terms of trade and investment-and-savings price effects, for the EBA and Rest of ACP regions. The contribution of allocative efficiency to welfare change for the EBA region is negative. The Rest of ACP by contrast enjoys strong welfare gains from improvements in allocative efficiency.
Erosion of Preferences
The second loss from trade liberalisation faced by the EBA region and, to a lesser degree, the Rest of ACP group arises from a loss of preferential access to IC markets, and particularly the EU market. 17 Under the EBA Agreement, implemented in the baseline, all exports from this region receive tariff free access to EU markets. The Rest of ACP also receives preferential access to EU markets, granted under the Cotonou Agreement. However, the preference margin is considerably smaller as tariffs are still imposed on imports of many commodities from this region to the EU (see Table 3 .3).
As tariffs on EBA exports to the EU are already abolished, further liberalisation is not possible between regions. However, the Common External Tariff of the EU, imposed on imports of third countries entering the EU, is reduced as part of the liberalisation process and thus third countries get to sell their goods more cheaply on the EU market. This erodes the preference margin of the EBA region exporters against third country producers and they face increased competition on EU markets. Table 7 show an alternative decomposition of the welfare effects on the EBA and Rest of ACP regions of EU agricultural tariff liberalisation alone. 18 In Table 7 , the effect of reducing tariffs on agricultural goods from the region in question to the EU (Subtotal 3) illustrates the gains achieved by the Rest of ACP region from cuts in the tariffs faced by their exports to the EU ($727 million) compared to same effect for the EBA region ($0 as no such barriers remain to be cut). Whilst it might be expected that the impact of third country exporters gaining increased access to EU markets (Subtotal 7) would be negative for both regions, these welfare measures also capture some impacts on each region's terms of trade position from which it may benefit. 17 The Mediterranean rim countries also suffer a similar welfare loss resulting from the erosion of their preferential access to the EU. 18 The tariff liberalisation results for EBA and Rest of ACP are decomposed into eight subtotals representing the impact of reducing EBA/ACP import tariffs on goods from the EU (1) and from third countries (2) and the reduction on tariffs on EBA/ACP exports to the EU (3) and to the rest of the world (4). Subtotal (5) shows the impact of the reduction in imports tariffs on trade between EBA/ACP regions themselves. The next two subtotals calculate the impact on EBA/ACP of the reductions in EU tariffs on goods from the rest of the world (6) and of rest of the world tariffs on EU exports (7). Subtotal (8) calculates the residual effect from trade liberalisation between third regions.
Conclusions
The GTAP model is used to estimate the potential effects on the global economy of a successful conclusion to the Doha Round. Agricultural trade liberalisation as simulated in this paper consists of a stylised scenario, incorporating improvements in market access, domestic support and export competition. The shocks do not represent attempts to model specific modalities of the ongoing negotiations, rather they are broad measures designed to generate results that will be indicative of future changes. The simulation is implemented against a baseline projection of the world economy over the next decade.
Particular attention is given to comparing the differences in results of liberalisation by industrialised countries and by developing countries and on the analysis of the outcomes for the latter group. The focus is on the radically different projected outcomes for two of the poorest groups of developing countries, the Least Developed Countries (here called the EBA group) and other, mainly African countries which are part of the Rest of ACP group.
The study draws important conclusions about the likely impact of further agricultural trade liberalisation for developing countries. Most developing regions can expect strong positive results from a successful conclusion to the Round. However, these gains often depend on developing countries undertaking their own liberalisation, and whether will happen must be uncertain. One message of this study is that the removal of trade barriers by developing countries not only helps to reduce the costs of their own inappropriate domestic policies but also encourages imports from other developing countries as well.
The more direct impact of the removal of trade barriers by industrialised countries is more ambiguous. The Mercosur group, Rest of ACP countries and the Rest of the World (which includes Australia, New Zealand and South Africa) will benefit significantly. However, EBA countries and Mediterranean countries will lose because of the erosion of their benefits from preferential access to industrialised country markets, particularly the EU. If the poorest developing countries are to benefit from the Doha Round, this issue of preference erosion must be addressed. Development assistance to help these countries to improve their supply-side responses may be more important than further trade liberalisation per se. Note 1: Self-sufficiency calculated as sum of value of domestic production divided by value of domestic consumption. 
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